The Development of the Power Sector in India: Issues and Prospects by Anantaram, Rajeev
Area: Asia-Pacific 
ARI 6/2010 
Date: 18/1/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Development of the Power Sector in India: Issues 
and Prospects (ARI) 
 
Rajeev Anantaram *
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and to be increasingly open to private sector participation, both domestic and foreign. 
 
 
Summary: This ARI focuses on the electric power sector in India, which is projected to 
grow rapidly over the next two decades. In particular, it discusses policy developments in 
the sector, the sector-specific issues that still remain unresolved and its main prospects, 
stressing especially the opportunities for private sector participation, both domestic and 
foreign. 
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Analysis: It is well accepted in Indian and international policy circles that bottlenecks in 
infrastructure in most subsectors –electric power, roads, ports, airports and sanitation–, 
with the possible exception of telecommunications, are acting as a serious impediment to 
rapid and sustained economic growth in India. The World Bank and the Indian Planning 
Commission have independently estimated that economic growth in India is on average 
between 1 and 3 percentage points lower than what it could have been if infrastructure 
bottlenecks were not as severe as they currently are.1 Indeed, India seriously lags behind 
not just advanced OECD economies in infrastructure development, but even other 
developing countries of comparable size such as Brazil and China. The UPA government, 
currently in its second successive term, has prioritised the development of infrastructure in 
an aggressively drawn out plan stretching over the remainder of the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan (2007-12) and the Twelfth Plan (2012-17). However, given the sheer size and 
diversity of the country and the extent of the catch-up, sustained policy commitment is 
required over the next two decades to bring India’s infrastructure up to world class 
standards. 
 
This paper focuses on the electric power sector in India, which is projected to grow rapidly 
over the next two decades. In particular, it discusses policy developments in the sector, 
especially since the passage of the landmark ‘new’ Electricity Act (2003), the sector-
specific issues that still remain unresolved, primarily due to a combination of a complex 
                                                 
* Senior Fellow, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New 
Delhi. 
1 The Planning Commission has recommended spending between 10% and 15% of GDP over the next two 
decades on the development of infrastructure. This translates into US$150 billion to US$200 billion annually at 
current levels of GDP. 
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administrative structure and the reluctance of the State Electricity Boards (SEB, hereafter) 
to accede to a new policy framework that would dilute their unchallenged authority, and 
the contours of future development, especially the opportunities for private-sector 
participation, both domestic and foreign, in the development of the power sector in India. 
 
Overview 
The power sector was understandably underdeveloped at the time of India’s 
independence from theUK in 1947, both in terms of available capacity and per capita 
consumption. Development policy in India for nearly two decades after independence was 
inspired by the Soviet model of planned development, which had enabled the erstwhile 
Soviet Union to leapfrog the development process and transform itself from a 
predominantly agrarian nation to an industrialised country within the span of a generation. 
India’s policy planners under the active stewardship of the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, shared a similar vision for India. 
 
The development model adopted as a consequence was centred on the development of 
heavy industry, which was perceived to generate far deeper forward and backward 
linkages with the rest of the economy. Agriculture and the development of light industry 
(especially consumer durables) were not given the importance they deserved until much 
later in the early 1960s, when the shortcomings of the existing model became apparent. 
The importance of power generation was not lost on Indian planners, resulting in a 
concerted effort to increase generation, distribution and transmission capacity to power 
the industrial development programme. The power generation programme sought to 
exploit India’s considerable endowments in coal and water resources.2 Hydro power 
projects also served to irrigate vast stretches of farmland and assist in flood control, in 
addition to generating power. 
 
The ownership structure of the power sector in India was also influenced by Soviet 
models, which posited government control of the core sectors of the economy 
(‘commanding heights’).3 However, the administrative arrangement was decentralised in 
that power was decreed to be a ‘concurrent’ subject with federal and provincial 
governments having a say in the formulation and implementation of policy.4 The Electricity 
Act (1948) was formulated to give direction to the development of the electric power 
industry and resulted in the creation of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) to oversee 
this development. The Electricity Act, notably its emphasis on state control over the 
industry continued unchallenged till the 1980s, due to a combination of an ideological 
commitment to socialism (reinforced during the Indira Gandhi Administration) and the 
emergence of interest groups, especially the beneficiaries of huge power subsidies, who 
were predominantly part of a politician-bureaucrat-industrialist-rich farmer nexus. 
 
                                                 
2 India was the first country in Asia to initiate a fledgling nuclear programme in 1956, under the ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ programme, with Canadian assistance. This assistance programme continued until 1974 after which it 
was discontinued following India’s first nuclear weapons test. 
3 There were pockets within India where the provision of power (mostly generation) was privately undertaken, 
the most notable exception being the city of Mumbai (then Bombay). Power was generated by the Tata Power 
Company (a private entity) but was distributed by the local government run Bombay Electric Supply and 
Transport Company (BEST). Other cities that privately provided power were Ahmedabad, Surat, Calcutta and 
recently parts of New Delhi. 
4 The tremendous variation in state policies is a cause of increasing frustration among private sector players, 
which in some ways has deterred participation. The amendments to the Electricity Act aim to reduce these 
discrepancies, while still allowing states the autonomy to formulate state specific policies. The enormity of the 
effort for a country as diverse as India needs no further elaboration. 
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The first signs of change in the policy regime with regard to the power sector emerged in 
the early 1980s, ironically under the stewardship of Indira Gandhi. The result was the 
acceptance that private sector participation would have to be encouraged if India was to 
stave off a serious power crisis that not only dampened India’s growth prospects, but 
actually threatened to cripple the economy. This process of liberalisation gained further 
momentum in the mid 1980s under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, whose vision for 
India’s development was driven by rapid assimilation of modern technology, which 
required the dismantling of administrative controls over the economy, widely viewed as 
obsolete. 
 
It is not particularly well known that in India, reforms in the power sector were actually 
initiated before those in the telecom sector. If progress in the subsequent implementation 
of power sector reforms has not been as smooth as with telecom, it is largely for reasons 
discussed above. The most visible manifestation of the new liberalised environment 
during the 1980s was the invitation to foreign power producers (called Independent Power 
Producers –IPP–) to set up power plants in the country. The arrangement was for the 
IPPs to sell power to the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) at a unit price adjusted for cost of 
capital and exchange rate risks, especially since much of the fuel used was to be 
imported. The two companies most visibly involved in this effort were Cogentrix, a 
California based company and the now defunct Enron Corporation. Enron withdrew 
amidst accusations of price gouging and unfair practices to coerce the then state 
government of Maharashtra to accede to the unit price of power it was charging, which 
was calculated to be far above the global average.5
 
The controversy that led to Enron’s exit from India did retard India’s progress in attracting 
foreign investment to its power sector. Some of these misgivings still persist, especially for 
generation companies, despite the extensive liberalisation of the power sector that has 
been enacted by the most recent Electricity Act. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
which governed India between 1999 and 2004 can be credited with taking the first 
aggressive steps towards revamping the infrastructure sector in India, though it could be 
argued that the parlous state of India’s infrastructure makes it hard to see how any 
government could have acted differently. The NDA was a coalition of political parties from 
the extreme left to the extreme right and it is heartening to note that there is multi-partisan 
agreement that the development of world-class infrastructure across subsectors is a 
national priority.6 A positive consequence of this convergence is an explosive growth in 
private sector interest (both domestic and foreign) in India’s power sector growth story. 
 
Recent Policy Changes and Implications: The Electricity Act (2003) 
As discussed in the preceding section, the power sector in India could best be described 
as characterised by policy stasis between 1947 and the mid 1980s. Even the decision to 
invite IPPs to set up power plants in India was done on an ad-hoc and case-by case basis 
and was not part of any comprehensive policy shift. Progress in opening up the power 
sector to private investment, especially Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), was also 
                                                 
5 Plans are afoot to revive the generation of power from the plant by augmenting the infrastructure already set 
in place in the mid 1990s, through a consortium of Indian and foreign firms. Operational details at this point 
are hazy. 
6 Some left-wing political parties have criticized the recent infrastructure development drive as being too 
‘urban centric’ in that it largely ignores rural geographies which are in critical need of infrastructure 
development. Recent governments are addressing this problem with the initiation of programmes such as the 
Prime Minister’s Rural Road Scheme to develop rural road infrastructure and the formation of dedicated 
companies like the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC), a listed company on the Bombay Stock Exchange. 
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retarded by the Enron episode and the experience of other less-known IPPs during the 
early 1990s. Policy planners agreed that a legalised framework was needed to invigorate 
growth and investment in the power sector. 
 
The (new) Electricity Act (2003) was a landmark policy document in that it provided the 
first legislative framework to revamp the legal and regulatory framework governing the 
power sector. It signalled a new openness to reform and a desire to accelerate sector 
reform in an effort to harmonise the operations of various agencies in the sector. The 
legislation is incremental, given the enormity of the task at hand and hence remains a 
work in progress. However, its importance in laying the foundation for rapid growth of the 
power sector in India cannot be minimised. 
 
The salient features of the Electricity Act are as follows: 
 
• ‘Unbundling’ of the generation, distribution and transmission sector. 
• Complete liberalisation of the generation sector to allow private sector participation. 
• Removal of FDI limits on generating companies and capital equipment manufacturing 
companies, with the result that 100% equity participation is permitted. 
• Permitting ‘open access’ whereby consumers above 1 MW of power could choose 
their own suppliers and power producers were allowed to sell beyond provincial 
markets in an effort to create a nation-wide market for power. 
• Permitting ‘merchant sales’ whereby power producers could sell excess power over 
and above what was contracted to SEBs, at market determined rates. 
• Regularising the supply chain, especially for coal, whereby thermal power producers 
could enter into binding long term arrangements with domestic coal producers. Import 
of fuel and feedstock were also liberalised as were foreign exchange regulations for 
domestic power producers seeking to augment supplies by purchasing coal mines or 
rights in oil and gas fields abroad. 
 
Reactions to the Electricity Act have been mixed with critics arguing that the legislation did 
not go far enough, especially in enacting the radical reform that was needed to pull the 
Indian power sector out of its low growth rate trap that had hobbled it for the past five 
decades. On the other hand, its proponents argued that any reform in a sector as 
sensitive as the power sector in India can only be incremental and point to the 
tremendous obstacles that power sector reform has had to face, even 12 years after 
sweeping reforms were enacted in the rest of the economy. 
 
The Impact of the New Legislation and the Way Forward 
While the legislation enacted was certainly forward looking, responses from the private 
sector have followed a wait-and-see approach, given India’s long autarchic tradition, 
characterised by a high level of government control over the economy and the recent 
experiences of IPPs in India during the 1990s. However, the green shoots of private 
sector participation (both Indian and foreign) are beginning to emerge, especially in the 
power equipment sector, where India is seen as being among the two most promising 
markets in the world, along with China. 
 
The Eleventh Plan (2007-12) called for the addition of 78,000 MW of power from all 
sources. It is unlikely that this target will be realised, though a late surge during the past 
few years has resulted in the rapid addition of generating capacity. It is envisioned that the 
final capacity addition at the end of the Eleventh Plan will be somewhere between 60,000 
and 65,000 MW. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012-17) is even more ambitious, calling for 
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the addition of over 100,000 MW of power. Planners are confident of realising this target 
given that the policy reforms of the Electricity Act would have had time to play out, leading 
to greater private sector participation is concerned. 
 
It is undeniable that the liberalisation process initiated by the Electricity Act involving 
greater private sector participation cannot be reversed. Indeed, private sector participation 
in power generation is expected to increase from 10% during the Eleventh Plan to 34% 
during the Twelfth plan. Thus while the government is heavily investing in ramping up the 
capacities of the state-owned National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and the 
National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC), which until now were the predominant 
thermal and hydro power producers, respectively, power sector liberalisation has led to a 
rapid increase in the number of private-sector players and a resultant decrease in the 
share of power produced by state-owned enterprises. 
 
Another policy reform that has been recently enacted is the de-linking of NTPC and 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), where supply of power generating equipment is 
concerned. As a result, NTPC is not obliged to generate all its generating equipment from 
BHEL. Consequently, private sector power equipment manufacturers have a tremendous 
opportunity to sell equipment to India’s largest power generator. The same applies to 
NHPC, the country’s largest hydro power generator. This has led to several private-sector 
players, domestic and foreign, ramping up their production capacities in India and entering 
into joint ventures to competitively bid for supply of equipment for power projects.7
 
Another interesting development that has taken place is India’s aggressive pursuit of 
regional power trading agreements with neighbouring countries. These agreements were 
earlier limited to Bhutan, whereby India financed the construction of hydropower plants in 
that country, in return for the export of excess power generated to India. Such agreements 
are being extended to Nepal and Bangladesh for the development of hydro and gas-
based power plants, respectively. It is expected that by 2020 over 20,000 MW of power 
will be procured from external sources. While earlier agreements required capital 
equipment to be sourced from BHEL and the power to be generated by government 
entities, power equipment will hereafter be sourced through competitive bidding, while 
generation will largely be through structured finance arrangements underwritten on a 
case-by-case basis by the Indian government. Policy planners are very optimistic about 
the prospects of such agreements as it represents a win-win situation for both power 
exporters, who would benefit from the export revenue and power-hungry importers like 
India. 
 
Despite full liberalisation, foreign players have not entered the power-generation market 
with the same enthusiasm as power-equipment manufacturers, preferring to adopt a 
cautious approach. The first positive step in this direction is the decision by China Light 
and Power Company to set up a 200 MW coal-fired plant in the north-western state of 
Haryana. On the other hand, domestic power producers such as Reliance Power, Tata 
Power, Jindal Steel & Power and several other companies have aggressively entered the 
generation space and have ambitious plans to expand existing capacities. 
                                                 
7 Examples of joint ventures between Indian foreign power equipment manufacturers include Larsen & 
Toubro’s joint venture with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to manufacture super-critical steam turbines, Jindal 
Steel Works’ joint venture with Toshiba and Alstom’s agreement with Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited. 
Several companies with an established presence in India, such as Siemens and General Electric, are 
significantly expanding operations in India to manufacture next generation technology and also their related 
R&D activity. 
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Despite the positive intention displayed by successive governments in reforming the 
power sector, there are certain serious shortcomings within the power sector in India, both 
structural and administrative, which it is hoped will be addressed soon: 
 
(1) Transmission capacity lags behind generation capacity, with the result that the 
power generated often cannot be evacuated. This has created considerable 
opportunities for the private sector and several domestic companies like Larsen 
and Toubro, Reliance Infrastructure and Kalpataru Transmission Systems, as well 
as foreign companies such as Areva T&D, are ramping up capacity for producing 
transmission equipment in India. 
 
(2) Supplies of coal and gas to the private sector have yet to be completely 
streamlined, though the government has constituted a high-power committee to 
address this issue, which is expected to turn in its recommendations shortly. This 
is a relatively minor problem given that foreign firms can source fuel from abroad, 
subject to foreign exchange clearance. 
 
(3) Land acquisition is a problem. It has been recommended that the CEA purchase 
land of suitable size, which generation companies could bid for. Progress on this 
count has been tardy. 
 
(4) The problem of ‘open access’ persists, as does the merchant power facility, both 
permitted by the Electricity Act. Given that power is a concurrent subject, states 
retain the authority to deny open access. For example, the two most industrialised 
states in India, Maharashtra and Gujarat, allow both open access and merchant 
sales, while Karnataka, a fairly advanced state and India’s Information Technology 
hub, does not. The Power Ministry in India has recently tabled a parliamentary 
note, mandating open access.8 The granting of open access is expected to greatly 
enhance interest among private power-generating companies. 
 
(5) The financial situation of most SEBs is still parlous and so generating companies 
are still anxious about recovering payments on power sales to these boards, 
though the federal government underwrites some of these sales. The present 
arrangement is that any financial bailouts of the SEBs is deducted from the 
allocations made to the respective states, thereby adding pressure on states to be 
more responsible in ensuring effective metering of supplies and minimal 
Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses. 
 
(6) A bigger problem to reform is the resistance of SEBs to unbundling, fearing that 
unbundling would make it easier to identify the source of financial losses. SEBs 
are also reluctant to part with exclusive rights to T&D, widely seen as the most 
lucrative businesses in the sector, despite the abolition of exclusive privilege by 
the Electricity Act. Private sector companies are aggressively petitioning the 
government to be allowed entry into T&D as well, so as to be able to provide end-
to-end solutions to consumers. A resolution of this issue in favour of greater 
private sector participation in T&D is expected soon. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Business Standard, 23/XII/2009, p. 6. 
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Conclusion: Recent legislation in the form of the Electricity Acts and amendments such 
as universalising open access have added a spirit of dynamism to the power sector in 
India. It is hard to see this trend reversing. Indian private sector companies are also 
confident of competing with foreign companies in all sectors and hence the possibility of a 
return to autarchy under pressure from domestic lobbies is equally unlikely. The issues 
previously discussed can be daunting, but the regulatory regime is evolving and is being 
amended to induce greater transparency and a level playing field. Above all else, there is 
multiparty agreement on the need for urgent reforms, which minimises the chances of 
political disruption. From a private investor’s standpoint, this augurs remarkably well and 
players who are willing to cope with an evolving regulatory regime will reap rich rewards in 
the near to medium future. 
 
Rajeev Anantaram 
Senior Fellow, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), 
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